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LATIN AMERICAN UPDATE: SOMETHING
IS GOING ON IN LATIN AMERICA
Mauricio Baquero Herrera*
HE time period spanning from 2005-2006 has been a decisive pe-
riod in the modern history of Latin America. Determinant events
in the politics of the region seem to have changed the approach of
Latin American countries to unilateralism, regionalism, and multilateral-
ism, in addition to economic and social policies. Certainly, there is some-
thing going on in the region that is difficult to grasp at first glance. The
change has been gradual; it is politically oriented as well because it ap-
pears to be the region's reaction to decades of implementing questionable
imported economic policies and failed models of development. The Pres-
ident of Venezuela has been influential in effecting these changes in the
region. Such effect occurs, among other causes, as the political tendency
in the region leans to the left. An increasing number of Latin American
countries are electing left-wing parties that are gaining more presence in
congresses or are actually getting access to the executive power.
At the same time, Latin America is more independent from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF). Countries such as Argentina and Brazil
have paid back their debts or, as in the Colombian case, have ended the
use of IMF's facilities for the time being. This is one of the most impor-
tant economic events in the last two decades for these countries. It
means that their fiscal, macroeconomic, financial, and overall economic
policies will not be influenced by the IMF staff or otherwise subjected to
any kind of conditional prerequisites. In sum, Latin American countries
are achieving independence from one of the most influential international
financial institutions.
Does this mean that the region is growing up? The answer to this ques-
tion is far from clear. What is evident, however, from the point of view of
the external policies of the Latin American nations is the formation of
two main blocks: the first one comprises a group of countries that have
signed or are in the process of negotiating a Preferential Trade Agree-
ment (PTA) with the United States and are looking to the Pacific as a
long term project; the second comprises countries not aligned with the
United States' policies. The formation of these two blocks is transform-
ing the region's traditional approach to regionalism. For instance, Vene-
zuela suddenly withdrew from the Andean Community, the oldest sub-
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regional economic integration scheme in South America.' The Andean
Community was deeply affected by this sudden withdrawal. But this An-
dean group has become stronger and refreshed by the recent Chilean ad-
hesion. In addition, MERCOSUR, the most promising sub-regional
integration scheme of the 1990s, seems to be losing its internal cohesion
because Uruguay is starting negotiations with the United States towards a
PTA, and the group needs Venezuela as a new full member. The follow-
ing sections summarize the most important aspects of these
transformations.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLICY OF VENEZUELA AND ITS
EFFECTS IN LATIN AMERICA: OIL, ECONOMIC
POWER, AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE
Although there are no reliable estimates of world oil reserves available
to the public, 2 president Hugo Chavez acts as if Venezuela has the largest
oil reserves in the world.3 Most of the schemes set up by Chavez in Latin
America during the last months involve oil. Venezuela made a pact with
Cuba to expand subsidized shipments of oil to Cuba in return for the
services of 17,000 Cuban doctors. 4 Venezuela, together with Argentina
and Brazil, created Petrosur,5 an agreement to develop a field in Vene-
zuela's heavy-oil belt in the Orinoco, a refinery in Brazil's northeast, and
an oil and gas venture in Argentina. At the same time, Chavez estab-
lished Petrocaribe, a project that offers cheap credit for oil imports to
Caribbean and Central American countries. 6 It gave the signatories
1. In short, the Andean Community is a group of four South American countries that
have combined resources and efforts in order to foster autonomous industrial
growth in the region. For more information on the Andean Community visit its
homepage, http://www.comunidadandina.org/INGLES/who.htm.
2. According to OPEC, the bulk of OPEC oil reserves are located in the Middle East,
with Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq contributing 57 percent to the OPEC total. Ven-
ezuela is an important part of the OPEC share of the World Crude Oil Reserves.
See Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, Annual Statistical Bulletin
(2005), http://www.opec.org/library/Annual%20Statistical%2OBulletin/pdf/
ASB2005.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2006).
3. On April 3, 2006 Mr. Chavez told BBC Newsnight that "Venezuela has the largest
oil reserves in the world. In the future Venezuela won't have any more oil - but
that's in the 22nd Century." That program quoted an analysis by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy, according to which "at today's prices Venezuela's oil reserves are
bigger than those of the entire Middle East - including Saudi Arabia, the Gulf
states, Iran and Iraq." See BBC Newsnight: Chavez Rules Out Return to Cheap Oil
(BBC television broadcast Apr. 3, 2006), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
americas/4871938.stm (last visited Oct. 15, 2006).
4. "A 2005 agreement sent 20% of Cuban doctors to serve in poor urban Venezuelan
barrios, in exchange for a daily supply of 90,000 barrels of Venezuelan oil." See
Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Cuba Comes in from the Cold, CUBA JOURNAL,
July 31, 2006, available at http://cubajournal.blogspot.com/2006 07_01_cubajournal
archive.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2006).
5. Richard Smith, Venezuela's Geopolitical Chess, VENEZUELANALYSIS.COM, July 12,
2004, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1215 (last visited Oct.
19, 2006).
6. Dilip Hiro, The Power of Oil, YALEGLOBAL ONLINE, Jan. 10, 2006, http://
yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=6761 (last visited Oct. 19, 2006).
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up to 15 years to pay for Venezuelan oil with a nominal 2 percent
interest at $20 a barrel, one-third less than the prevalent price of $30.
The updated scheme enabled the signatories to pay only $40 a barrel
instead of the market rate that shot up to nearly $70 in October.7
On July 22, 2006, at a meeting of Andean presidents, Mr. Chavez pro-
posed Petroandina, under which these oil-producing countries would co-
operate on pipelines and refining. 8
Venezuela has already bought, in 2005, about $3.1 billion in Argentine
bonds. 9 Venezuela has also bought external debt from Ecuador. 10 Vene-
zuela has plans with Colombia to build pipe lines capable of linking
Maracaibo to the Pacific, making it more efficient to export Venezuelan
oil to Asia.1" Venezuela has even sent heating oil, "a 'humanitarian' gift
from Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez" to the Bronx in the United
States.1 2 Another example of Chavez's oil policy is Telesur, a new re-
gional television channel that began pilot transmissions on July 24, 2006.13
This television channel is backed by the governments of Argentina, Cuba,
Uruguay, and Venezuela. But 70 percent of the channel's $10 million
start-up cost comes from Venezuela's government. 14 These initiatives
have increased Chavez's popularity. In a word, as The Economist sug-
gests, "Mr. Chdivez is using some of his country's windfall oil revenues to
procure friends and influence abroad, especially in Latin America. '15
II. THE LEFT-WING POLITICS AND THE RETURN TO THE
SOCIAL CONCERNS IN LATIN AMERICA:
MORE THAN WORDS?
Latin America's political map has changed as twelve of the region's
7. Id.
8. Venezuela and Latin America: Using Oil to Spread Revolution, THE ECONOMIST,
July 28, 2005, available at http://www.economist.com/world/la/displayStory.cfm?
story-id=4232330 (last visited Oct. 15, 2006).
9. The Chdvez Play, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 26, 2006, available at http://www.econo-
mist.com/displayStory.cfm?storyid=8086810 (last visited Nov. 15, 2006).
10. Venezuela agreed to buy up to $300 million out of Ecuador's planned $500 million
bond issue. See Q&A with the Board of Advisers, INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE:
LATIN AMERICA ADVISOR, Aug. 1, 2005, http://www.thedialogue.org/iac/eng/
about/documents/LAA050801-pg3.pdf#search=%22Venezuela%20buys%2OEcua-
dor%20external%20debt%22 (last visited Oct. 15, 2006).
11. See Colombia, Via de Crudo Venezolano a China, EL TIEMPO.COM, Oct. 2, 2006,
http://www.eltiempo.com/tiempoimpreso/edicionimpresa/economicas/2006-10-02/
ARTICULO-WEB-NOTAINTERIOR-3266566.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2006).
12. Michelle Garcia, Politics or Not, Bronx Warmly Receives Venezuelan Heating Oil,
WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 2005, at A08, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/07/AR2005120702245.html (last visited Oct. 15,
2006).
13. Mary Crane, U.S.-Venezuelan Relations, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Nov.
18, 2005, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/9253/ (last visited Sept. 12,
2006)
14. Venezuela and Latin America: Using Oil to Spread Revolution, supra note 8.
15. Id.
2006]
616 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 12
countries 16 have held presidential elections between November 2005 and
the end of 2006. At the time of writing, there are at least six left-wing
governments ruling in important countries of the region: Argentina, 17
Brazil,18 Bolivia, 19 Chile,20 Uruguay, 21 and Venezuela.2 2 Recent elec-
tions held in Peru2 3 and Mexico 24 also demonstrate the importance of
left-wing movements in Latin America. The institutional uncertainty ex-
perienced in Mexico after the 2006 elections, exacerbated by the decision
of the candidate of the left to create a parallel government,2 5 is a worry-
ing demonstration of the penetration and support given by the Mexican
population to this political option. Ecuador2 6 is another country where a
left-wing party is increasing its chances of winning the forthcoming
elections.
But it is important to bear in mind that the left in Latin America are
not the same-there are important differences. For instance, Bachelet's
government in Chile is closer to pro-free market than Morales's govern-
ment in Bolivia. The external policies of Lula are more moderate than
the aggressive approach of Chavez. Overall, these left-wing governments
focus on social programs in education, land reform, and healthcare.
Therefore, social issues are being emphasized by broadening state help to
the poorest families through pooling public money for programs that alle-
16. These countries are Mexico, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, Haiti, Colombia,
Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela.
17. President Nestor Kirchner became the Argentinean Head of State in May 2003.
18. President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva became Brazil's first left-wing president in four
decades in October 2002. He was re-elected on October 1, 2006. But cash-for-
votes scandals and the shadow of corruption in his government caused him to miss
out on outright-victory in the first round. The Brazilian election run-off will be on
October 29, 2006. He is considered a moderate left-wing ruler.
19. President Evo Morales was elected on December 18, 2005 by an unprecedented 54
percent of the votes. He is the first indigenous president in Bolivia. Mr Morales is
considered very close to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez.
20. President Michelle Bachelet was elected in January 2006. She has continued the
pro-free market policies of Chile's economy as well as the openness of Chile's
economy to the world. Her latest move in terms of regionalism has been the deci-
sion to join the Andean Community again as an associated member.
21. President Tabare Vazquez became Uruguay's first left-wing head of state in March
2005.
22. President Chavez is likely to be re-elected on December 3, 2006. His Revolucion
Bolivariana is intended to be a new form of socialism.
23. President Alan Garcia was elected on June 4, 2006. He is considered a centre-left
candidate in comparison to the other candidate, nationalist Ollanta Humala.
24. President Felipe Calderon was elected on July 2, 2006. But the left-wing candidate
Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador insisted he had evidence of irregularities and de-
manded a full recount. The Electoral Tribunal ruled on September 5, 2006 that
Mr. Calderon had won the election. Mr. Lopez Obrador did not accept it and
refused to recognize Mr. Calderon as the Constitutional President.
25. "Presidential runner-up Andrds Manuel L6pez Obrador said he would create an
'alternate government,' calling Calder6n an 'illegitimate president."' See The
Washington Post blog on Mexican elections, http://blog.washingtonpost.com/mex-
icovotes/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2006).
26. The elections in Ecuador are going to be held on October 15, 2006. Candidates are
Socialist Leon Roldos Aguilera (ahead in the polls), businessman Alvaro Noboa,
Cynthia Viteri, from the Social Christian Party, and Rafael Correa, an economist.
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viate extreme poverty. 27 Are such policies sustainable? Would they only
mean a short-term solution to the poor as they leave aside important
structural reforms? What are the macroeconomic and fiscal implications
of these programs? These questions need to be addressed in order to
make poverty mitigation more than mere words.
III. THE INCREASING INDEPENDENCE OF LATIN AMERICA
FROM THE IMF: A GROWN UP REGION?
One of the most important pieces of economic news in the region is the
increasing independence of relevant Latin American countries from the
IMF. The IMF's presence in the region was used to coordinate and im-
plement economic policies. But during the period of 2005-2006, two of
the IMF's largest debtors proclaimed an early repayment: "Argentine
president [sic] N6stor Kirchner announced 15 December that Argentina
would repay the entire $9.8 billion debt owed to the IMF through 2008.
Two days earlier, Brazil had declared an early repayment of its outstand-
ing obligations to the IMF amounting to $15.5 billion." s2 8 In September
2006, Colombia ended its agreements with the IMF.29
This means increasing independence of the region from international
financial institutions in a time when the IMF is under scrutiny by the
world financial community. If in the 1980s the Washington Consensus
was formed, it seems that in 2000s a Latin American consensus is rising: It
is time to look for other forms of financing the needs of the countries, it is
time to try to be autonomous in economic decisions. There is nothing
wrong with growing up. What concerns all involved is how. This inde-
pendency from the IMF might be a mistake as a future economic crisis
would prove or it might mean the most important economic decision in
Latin America in the last decades. It is too soon to assess the overall
result of such independency. But it is not naYve to suspect that Latin
American governments and Central Banks are aware of the responsibili-
ties of this move. It is time to show off what they have learned from the
past.
27. In Brazil there is the "'Bolsa Familia' (family grant)" program. It guarantees to
poor citizens $45 a month from the federal government. In return, the families
must ensure that their children stay in school and follow a prescribed course of
vaccinations. See Brazil Poor Feel Benefits of Lula's Policies, BBC NEWS, Sept. 18,
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5301240.stm (last visited Oct. 15, 2006).
28. See Latin America Sends IMF Packing, THE BRE-rON WOODS PROJEcT, Jan. 23,
2006, http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art.shtml?x=507679 (last visited Oct. 15,
2006).
29. The plans for economic development of the last two Colombian governments were
based on agreements reached by the Minister of Finance and the IMF staff. The
IMF has strongly influenced Colombian macroeconomic and fiscal policies while
the government has used the IMF excuse to implement unpopular reforms. See
Carlos Caballero Argdez, Se fue el FMI y... Nadie se dio Cuenta, EL TIEMPO.COM,
Sept. 15, 2006, http://www.eltiempo.com/opinion/columnistas/carloscaballeroargez/
ARTICULO-WEB-NOTAINTERIOR-3245333.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2006).
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IV. THE EFFECT OF THE PTAS SIGNED OR IN PROCESS OF
NEGOTIATION BY UNITED STATES AND SOME LATIN
AMERICAN COUNTRIES: THE REGION DIVIDED
INTO TWO MAIN BLOCKS
In general, the main sub-regional agreements present in the region,
such as the Andean Community or MERCOSUR, are of a South-South
nature, joining mainly civil law based and Spanish speaking nations.30
They are based on the Balassian model of PTAs.31 These agreements
consider integration as an evolving process, starting as a Free Trade Area,
which only takes into account trade in goods, followed by a Customs
Union, whereby all member countries agree on setting up similar tariffs
applicable to non-members. Finally, the process should reach a Common
Market that becomes the highest phase of economic integration. It is
characterised by the free circulation of goods, services, capital, and peo-
ple. At the same time, differential treatment and the concession of pref-
erences to less developed members is a principle that is an important
feature of the Latin American approach to economic integration.
All South-South schemes (i.e., CACM, CARICOM, CAN, and
MERCOSUR) adopted this approach. Due to different reasons, reach-
ing the stage of a Customs Union has been difficult for all these sub-
regional agreements. Equally important, the aim of reaching a Common
Market has been set up only within the last decade. It explains why Latin
American countries have recently been getting into the trend of negotiat-
ing formal liberalisation of the trade in services.
In contrast, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a
Free Trade Area that goes well beyond trade in goods. It does not estab-
lish a Common Market. It is not even a Customs Union with a common
external tariff. It does not cede sovereignty to common economic or po-
litical institutions and it does not contemplate the free movement of la-
bor. Furthermore, this agreement does not embrace any agricultural or
social common policies, and it does not set up special funds to remedy the
imbalances that may be present among its members.32 In addition,
NAFTA uses an "all or nothing" method of negotiation. 33
From the day NAFTA entered into force,34 it became a new paradigm
of economic integration in Latin America, not only due to its North-
South approach and the comprehensive scope of subjects being negoti-
ated, but also because of the impetus given by the U.S. government to
this bilateral approach to commercial liberalization. The age of the
30. Brazil is the only representative exemption.
31. Bela Balassa, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (R.D. Irwin 1961).
32. See Miguel Otero-Lathrop, MERCOSUR and NAFTA: The Need for Convergence,
4 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 116, 118 (1998).
33. These differences illustrate why many of the Latin American countries are not
familiar with the NAFTA-like approach and resent its equal treatment of the par-
ties in the clauses of the treaty without taking into consideration the evident asym-
metries that are present among the nations of the hemisphere.
34. NAFTA was signed on December 17, 1992 and went into effect on January 1, 1994.
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NAFTA-like agreements started as all countries in the region embraced
the policy of open regionalism. 35 Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela
signed as the Group of Three in 1994.36 The free trade agreement be-
tween Chile and the United States was signed on June 6, 2003, and en-
tered into force on January 1, 2004. 37 On August 5, 2005, CAFTA
members signed a PTA with the United States.38 It has been ratified by
all CAFTA members.39 On Tuesday, May 18, 2004, in Cartagena Colom-
bia, three members of the Andean Community started negotiations with
the United States for the establishment of a PTA.40 Peru already signed a
PTA with the United States on April 12, 2006.41 It is not yet in force.
Negotiations among the United States and Colombia have finished;42 the
PTA between these two countries is to be signed in November 2006. But
not all countries have joined this process. Ecuador decided to stop the
process. Bolivia initially acted as an observer, and when Evo Morales
became President of Bolivia he declined to enter into these kinds of
agreements.
35. Open regionalism contains two antithetical propositions. On the one hand, it ad-
vocates regional integration as opposed to multilateral or global integration. Re-
gionalism implies certain preferences among the members and a degree of
protection against non-members. On the other hand, it proposes openness to
other countries, blocs, and economies through different means, such as multilater-
alism. See Eduardo Mayobre, The Rules of the World Game in Latin America's
Foreign Policy, 53 CAPITJULOS DEL SELA 51, 60 (1998) (commenting on the concept
of open regionalism). See also Mauricio Baquero-Herrera, The Andean Commu-
nity: Finding Her Feet Within Changing and Challenging Multidimensional Condi-
tions, 10 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 577, 577-612 (2004).
36. The G-3 went into effect on January 1, 1995. But ten years later Venezuela an-
nounced its decision to withdraw.
37. See Fact Sheet: Office of the United States Trade Representative, The U.S.-Chile
Free Trade Agreement: An Early Record of Success (June 4, 2004), http://www.
ustr.gov/Document-Library/Fact-Sheets/2004/TheUS-ChileFreeTrade_Agree-
ment An EarlyRecord ofSuccess.html.
38. CAFTA was signed on August 5, 2004. See Dominican Republic-Central America-
United States Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 5, 2004, available at http://www.sice.
oas.org/Trade/CAFrA/CAFrADR-e/CAFTADRin-e.asp (last visited Oct. 20,
2006).
39. El Salvador: December 17, 2004; Honduras: March 3, 2005; Guatemala: March 10,
2005; Nicaragua: October 11, 2005; United States: July 27, 2005.
40. See Press Release, U.S.-Andean Free Trade Talks Progress in Atlanta, U.S. Dept.
of State (June 18, 2004), http://usinfo.state.gov/wh/Archive/2004/Sep/13-200589.
html. This process is the consequence of at least two circumstances. First, negoti-
ating a preferential trade agreement with the United States is important for the
Andean countries because the unilateral tariff preferences granted to certain prod-
ucts by the U.S. government, through the Andean Trade Preference Act and the
Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act will expire in 2006. There is
an obvious need to preserve the advantages obtained and the positions already
gained by some Andean products within U.S. markets. Second, the U.S. Trade
Representative, Robert Zoellick, adopted a policy of one-on-one negotiation due
to the difficulties in the negotiations of the FTAA and the WTO Doha Round.
41. See Press Release, Peru, United States Sign Comprehensive Free Trade Agree-
ment, U.S. Dept. of State (Apr. 12, 2006), http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2006/
Apr/14-987834.html.
42. See Press Release, United States and Colombia Conclude Free Trade Agreement,
U.S. Trade Rep. (Feb. 27, 2006), http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2006-
February/009168.html.
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The contrasts between the traditional Latin American pattern of inte-
gration and the NAFTA model being implemented through bilateral
agreements have produced at least two main consequences. First, it has
affected the old regionalism embodied in schemes such as the Andean
Community, CARICOM, or CAFTA. The case of the Andean Commu-
nity certainly is illustrative: it has been strongly troubled by the decision
of three of its members to enter into negotiations with the United States.
The internal cohesion of this scheme started to collapse when the Colom-
bian, Ecuadorian, and Peruvian negotiators realized that some of the su-
pranational rules already in force in the Andean sub-region were in
contradiction with the main clauses of the PTA under negotiations with
the United States. 43
Second, the Venezuelan government started to feel uncomfortable with
the closeness of these three countries with U.S. economic policies. Presi-
dent Chavez began increasing his criticisms of the Bush administration as
well as developing political and economic strategies to gain support for
his anti-American ideas. In March 2005, the Venezuelan President,
joined by other MERCOSUR leaders, declared the U.S.-sponsored Free
Trade Agreement for the Americas (FTAA) as dead, proposing a new
model instead: the ALBA initiative, 44 supported only by Cuba and Bo-
livia. From that day on, a chain of events started to happen. In October
2005, Venezuela announced its interest in becoming a MERCOSUR
member. In the beginning, this move was seen as an important step to
increasing integration in Latin America 45 as the Andean Community had
already given enough flexibility to its members to join other sub-regional,
43. Intellectual Property rights have been a contentious aspect in this process. The
original Decision 486 (2000) stipulated that Member Countries may take the nec-
essary measures to guarantee the protection of test data. With Decision 632, the
three member countries negotiated with the United States and pushed for a clarifi-
cation of the second paragraph of Article 266 of Decision 486. Venezuela and
Bolivia did not support such change. Because the Andean regulation requires
unanimity to adopt Decisions, the chances for this modification to pass were mini-
mal. But Decision 632 became a supranational regulation because Venezuela did
not assist with that meeting of the Commission and Bolivia was not allowed to
participate because it did not comply with the payments required by the Cartagena
Agreement to maintain the Andean Integration System. This move was seen by
Venezuela as inconvenient and triggered its final withdrawal from the Andean
Community. See Decision 486, Common Intellectual Property Regime, Andean
Community Commission (Sept. 14, 2000), available at http://www.comunidadand
ina.org/INGLES/normativa/D486e.htm; Decision 632, Clarification of the Second
Paragraph of Article 266 of Decision 486, Andean Community Commission (Apr.
6, 2006), available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/normativa/D632e.
htm.
44. ALBA is the Spanish acronym for the Bolivarian Alternative for the America (Al-
ternativa Bolivariana para la America). More information on ALBA can be found
at http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2006).
45. See DARfO MONTERO, South America: Mercosur Opens Doors to Worrying Fifth
Element, INTER PRESS SERVICE NEws AGENCY, Dec. 8, 2005, http://ipsnews.net/
news.asp?idnews=31340 (last visited Oct. 15, 2006).
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regional, or multilateral agreements. 46 But on April 22, 2006, the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela communicated in writing to the An-
dean Commission its decision to denounce the Cartagena Agreement. 47
On July 4, 2006, Venezuela became a full member of MERCOSUR. 48 On
August 9, 2006, through Decision 641, a Memorandum of Understanding
signed by the Member Countries of the Andean Community and the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was approved. 49 In less than a year,
Venezuela was out of the Andean Community and became a full member
of MERCOSUR-this is an event that has changed the conventional bal-
ance of power in the region.
As a reaction to the Venezuelan movements and, when everyone ex-
pected a rapid decline or even the end of the Andean Community, a
clever maneuver by the Andean leaders and the Chilean government pro-
duced an important effect. On August 7, 2006, the four Member Coun-
tries of the Andean Community formalized their invitation to Chile to
join the group as an Associate Member. 50 After consultations and fur-
ther contacts, Chile accepted the invitation and was granted the status of
Associate Member Country of the Andean Community in September
2006 through Decision 645.51 Ironically, in the early days of the Andean
scheme, when Chile retired from the Andean Pact, Venezuela decided to
join the group. Almost thirty-five years later, when Venezuela de-
nounced the Cartagena Agreement, Chile rejoined the Andean scheme.
46. See Decision 598, Trade Relations With Third Countries (July 16, 2004), available
at http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/normativa/D598e.htm (last visited Oct
15, 2006).
47. According to article 135 of the Cartagena Agreement, from the moment the Com-
mission is informed, the country denouncing the Agreement ceases to enjoy the
rights and obligations deriving from its status as a Member, with the exception of
the benefits received and granted in accordance with the sub-regional liberaliza-
tion program. Such benefits remain effective for a period of five years after the
date of the denouncement. See Cartagena Agreement, art. 135, 8 I.L.M. 910
(1969), available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/normativa/ande-triel.
htm (last visited Oct 15, 2006).
48. See Protocolo de Adhesi6n de la Repdiblica Bolivariana de Venezuela al
MERCOSUR, http:/www.vtv.gov.ve/ Documentos/protocoloadhesionmercosur04
julio06.pdf#search=%22Venezuela%20and%20Mercosur%22 (last visited Oct 15,
2006).
49. Decision 641 sets up a working group entrusted with the task of establishing the
temporary provisions applicable to safeguards, dispute settlement, sanitary and
phytosanitary measures, and technical obstacles to trade that are applicable to the
liberalization program for trade in goods, in accordance with article 135 of the
Cartagena Agreement. The group also defines the adjustments deemed necessary
to the rules of origin that are in effect for trade between the Parties. See Decision
641, Approval of the Memorandum of Understanding Signed by the Member
Countries of the Andean Community and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
Andean Community Commission (Aug. 10, 2006), available at http://www.
comunidadandina.org/ingles/normativa/D641e.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2006).
50. See Andean Community's Letter of Invitation to Chile, http://www.comunidadand
ina.org/ingles/documentos/documents/cartachile.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2006).
51. Decision 645, Granting of the Status of Associate Member Country of the Andean
Community to the Republic of Chile, Andean Council of Foreign Ministers (Sept.
20, 2006), http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/normativa/D645e.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 15, 2006).
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Basically, the adjustments carried on during the last year in the region
show the second effect of the external policies of the most influential
countries in the region: Latin America is divided into two main blocks.
The first block is more aligned to the U.S. economic policies and shares
the common feature of having a NAFTA-like agreement with the United
States. This group is looking to the North as well as to the Pacific. All
countries in Central America, the remaining members of the Andean
Community,52 and Chile, form a block of countries with access to the
Pacific. With regard to these countries, the strategy takes into account
their proximity to the United States as their actual main commercial part-
ner, as well as the potential of Asia as a main future trade partner. The
second block follows the Brazilian and Venezuelan lead53 and shares a
common attitude of independence from U.S. policies and closeness to
Europe.
V. A FINAL COMMENT
All transformations referred to above are going on without affecting
the U.S. policy in the region. The old backyard approach seems to re-
main in place even though President Bush came into office declaring that
Latin America was a priority. After the attacks of 9/11, the fight against
terrorism has focused the attention of U.S. policy makers on regions
other than Latin America. Without any doubt Latin America is changing.
What will be the final outcome of these changes? Would they mean an
independent and mature region? Or would they create more political
and economic uncertainty? How are they going to affect the Latin Amer-
ican citizenry? The implications these questions suggest that it is impor-
tant to keep an eye on the region.
52. Except for Bolivia taking into consideration its land-locked condition and the
closeness of its actual government to Chavez.
53. Who Leads Latin America Lula v Chavez, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 30, 2006. The
Venezuelan leader seems to be gaining more leadership in the region as Lula is
sinking into more and more scandals related to corruption. He certainly is losing
credibility.
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